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I. Introduction 
As the HIV / AIDS situation in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA) goes on, families , 
institutions and governments face difficult decisions as to allocating 
resources toward the care of those suffering from diseases. Countries 
within sSA follow the British model of socialized medicine. Although 
private institutions operate centers of health care, eighty-five percent of the 
people in these countries depend solely on the government plan for their 
health care.' Unlike developed countries (e.g., the United States) where 
AIDS has evolved into a chronic disease,2 in sSA AIDS is an end-stage 
terminal illness. With skyrocketing infection rates, communities in this 
region must balance their expenses meeting health care needs against the 
need to develop the infrastructure, food production and educational 
systems for the sake of future generations. The health care delivery 
systems in these regions are in crisis due to inadequate funding, scarcity of 
trained personnel, inadequate clean water supplies, high population 
growth, poor hygiene, high levels of illiteracy and poverty.) 
Drawing from Catholic teaching, this paper acknowledges that these 
communities are obliged to provide pain relief for these victims. For 
reasons that will be studied in detail , treatments beyond thi s should be 
regarded as extraordinary, and therefore not an obligation. This is based on 
the fact that ordinary means of treatment are relative to the availability of 
resources. The resources in the sub-Saharan region are not sufficient to 
provide any treatment beyond pain relief. 
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This paper's focus is on Catholic teaching pertaining to morally 
necessary measures to prolong life in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-
Saharan Africa. The discussion will begin with the development of 
Catholic teaching on prolonging life and will continue with the principles 
of ordinary and extraordinary means. Then, these principles will be applied 
to the socioeconomic conditions in sSA. 
II. Development of Catholic Principles of Life Prolonging Measures 
The present magisterial teaching of the Catholic Church on 
prolonging life has developed from the work of 16th and 17th century 
theologians.4 Church teachings have gained a new sense of moral 
importance, particularly in light of 20th century medical advances that 
successfully treat illnesses that previously were fatal. This renewed focus 
resulted in the development of present day magisterial declarations that 
provide guidance on moral situations involving treatments to prolong life. 
One of the earliest Church teachings on measures to prolong life was 
that of the 16th century Spanish Dominican theologian Francisco de 
Vitoria. He addressed the issue of when the refusal of food by an ill person 
violates the natural law obligation to preserve one's life.5 De Vitoria 
argued that if taking food held out the hope of prolonging an ill person 's 
life, then that person is morally obligated to take food. However, if the 
illness has so depressed the person 's spirit that taking food would be 
torturous, then eating is considered a moral impossibility. Under those 
circumstances, de Vitoria taught, refusing to eat is not a mortal sin, 
especially where there is little possibility that life will be extended.6 He 
further taught that one's obligation to eat does not create an obligation to 
obtain specific foods that may be expensive or difficult to obtain, even if by 
obtaining these foods, a person's life could be extended.? De Vitoria's final 
teaching on prolonging life also discusses the use of pharmaceutical 
treatments. In this teaching, de Vitoria suggests that a person is not morally 
obligated to take every possible measure to conserve life. The obligation 
to accept treatment has limits. One is not obligated to expend the family 
assets on a treatment that will prolong life but not cure the disease. Nor is 
one obligated to accept a novel treatment because of the possibility that it 
could extend one's life. The obligation is simply to accept those 
commonly available remedies. For de Vitoria, then, the obligation to 
accept medical treatment turns on the treatment 's costs and effectiveness. 
De Vitoria's teachings have become fundamental principles of 
Catholic teaching on prolonging life. For example, the Catholic Church 
teaches that life is a gift from God and one is required to take normal 
measures to preserve one's life. However, it recognizes certain 
circumstances in which this obligation becomes a moral impossibility, for 
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example, where there is great fear, danger, or burden. As a result, the 
person is excused because the obligation is deemed excessively difficult to 
meet.s Further, the Church teaches that one's obligation to preserve life is 
a limited obligation. There is no obligation to employ all possible means 
necessary to prolong one's life, but only those commonly available and 
financially affordable. Also, the obligation to seek out treatment is limited 
to those treatments that provide a reasonable hope of the benefit of 
returning one to a normal healthy state. 
One of the later theologians who expanded the teaching of de Vitoria 
was a Dominican theologian, Domingo Banez (1528-1604), who 
introduced the concepts of "ordinary and extraordinary" in the assessment 
of the morality of prolonging treatment. Banez argued that an individual is 
responsible for preserving life by "common food and clothing, common 
medicines, a certain common and ordinary pain; not, however, to a certain 
extraordinary and horrible pain, nor to expenses which are extraordinary in 
proportion to the status of this man."9 Even though there have been critics 10 of 
the ordinary and extraordinary distinction, the use of these concepts has 
continued to be an important aspect of the debates on prolonging life. 
The ordinary-extraordinary principle continued to be developed 
through the teachings of the Spanish theologian, Cardinal John de Lugo. 
De Lugo taught that preserving one's life is a moral obligation. Not to do 
so is equivalent to taking one's own life. De Lugo's teachings differed 
from those of his predecessors in one important aspect. He taught that 
when treatment does not provide reasonable hope of benefit, then there is 
no obligation to accept even ordinary treatment. II De Lugo further teaches 
that there is never an obligation to accept extraordinary means to preserve 
one's life, regardless of the possible benefit. 12 For de Lugo, there is a 
distinction between contributing to your death by refusing ordinary 
treatments and allowing deaths to occur by refusing extraordinary 
treatments. 13 The first is immoral under certain circumstances, and the 
second is not. De Lugo's teachings laid the foundation for the modem day 
distinction between suicide and euthanasia and allowing death to occur. 
Further, de Lugo's teachings also established the relativity l4 of what is 
ordinary and extraordinary because it is determined, in part, by one's 
financial circumstances and geographic location, as well as advances in 
medical treatment. 
Following de Lugo's contributions, the debate on prolonging life did 
not receive much attention until the 20th century Jesuit theologian Gerald 
Kelly addressed it in his influential writings. Kelly's contributions to the 
debate included defining the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
treatments. Ordinary treatments included those treatments that were 
obtainable without great difficulty. Extraordinary treatments included those 
that were excessively difficult to obtain, repugnant, or expensive. "In other 
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words, an extraordinary means is one which prudent men would consider 
at least morally impossible with reference to the duty of preserving one's 
life," 's Like de Lugo, Kelly argues that there is no moral obligation to 
accept ordinary treatment when there is little hope of benefit. 16 
Kelly's definition of ordinary and extraordinary treatment became 
widely accepted when Pope Pius XII adopted Kelly 's definitions in his 
1957 address to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists. In this 
address, Pope Pius drew heavily on the works of Vito ria, Banez, de Lugo 
and Kelly. He stated: 
Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whosoever is 
entrusted with the task of taking care of his fellow man) has the right 
and duty in case of serious illness to take the necessary treatment for 
the preservation of life and health . . . But normally one is held to use 
only ordinary means - according to circumstances of persons, places, 
times and culture - that is to say, means that do not involve any 
grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would 
be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of 
the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all 
temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the 
other hand, one is not forbidden to take more than the strictly 
necessary steps to preserve life and health, as long as he does not fail 
in some more serious duty.17 
Therefore, according to Pius XII, there are circumstances in which it 
may be immoral to seek out extraordinary treatments in order to preserve 
one's life . For example, if an ill person is married, with young children, 
and the extraordinary treatment available would result in the devastation of 
the family 's finances, to the extent that there would be no ability to provide 
for the minor children, obtaining the extraordinary treatment would be 
immoral , unless there is a high probability the treatment will return the ill 
person to health. Pius XII also introduced another important component of 
modem Church teaching. The obligation to preserve and advance one's 
physical well being is not greater than the obligation to preserve and 
advance one's spiritual relationship with God. To the extent that 
preserving life diminishes one's spiritual relationship, then the 
preservation of physical life becomes an immoral act. 
Pius XII's teachings imply that medical treatment is to be evaluated 
in the context of the patient 's overall medical condition and the patient's 
ability to pursue a spiritual relationship. Therefore, ordinary treatment is 
that which offers a reasonable hope of benefit and does not diminish one's 
ability to engage in a relationship with God and does not impose an 
excessive burden on the family of the ill person. Treatment that meets 
these qualifications imposes a moral obligation on the ill person to accept. 
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The Church teaching on prolonging life received further attention in 
the Declaration on Euthanasia , drafted in 1980 by the Congregation For 
the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). The extent to which the early writings of 
Vitoria, Banez and de Lugo had influenced the Church is clearly seen in the 
Declaration's teaching. In this Declaration, the terms "ordinary" and 
"extraordinary" were replaced with the terms "proportionate" and 
"disproportionate." However, as used, the terms are synonymous. As 
analyzed by CDF, the complexity, risk, and cost of treatment must be 
considered in determining whether a treatment is proportionate or 
disproportionate. Also, the degree of possible benefit to the patient that use 
of the treatment will afford must be determined. Further, the patient's 
financial resources must be a critical part of the analysi s in determining 
whether a proposed treatment is proportionate or not. Finally, CDF states 
as an absolute that when death is imminent, withholding or removing life 
support treatment is acceptable when continuing treatment would "only 
secure precarious and burdensome prolongation of life."18 
In short, Catholic teaching regards human life as a gift that imposes a 
responsibility on the individual to care for it. The responsibility commands 
upon people the duty to apply medical measures or treatments that conserve 
life. 19 However, the teaching does not advocate for the piteous and expensive 
prolongation of life through new medical advancements, "once the 
summons to eternity is clear and final."20 Applied to terminal illness that 
has no hope of a cure, Church teaching then holds that there is no moral 
obligation to receive treatment merely to delay death for a short time. 
III. Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment and the Futility Debate 
In the previous section we discussed the historical development of 
the Church's teaching on prolonging life. In this section we will focus 
more closely on the meaning of the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
and use them to evaluate the debate on treatment futility. This discussion 
will lay the framework for our later discussion on which treatments are to 
be categorized as ordinary and extraordinary in the context of the HIV / 
AIDS epidemic in sSA. 
A. Ordinary Treatment 
Ethical considerations of which treatments are determined to be 
ordinary focus on the treatments ' potential benefits to the patient and the 
burden imposed through obtaining the treatment. In determining the 
potential benefit of a treatment, the focus must be on the good of the 
patient as a whole, and not just what is good for this or that organ system 
individually. As stated by Gerald Kelly, ordinary treatments "are all 
medicines, treatments, and operations which offer reasonable hope of 
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benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and used without 
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience."21 While it is clear that 
medical treatment must provide a hope of benefit before one is obligated to 
accept it, the sticking point is understanding what is meant by "reasonable 
hope of benefit." Kelly' s writings show that defining the term is not an 
easy task Y Kelly offers some guidance in that he seems to emphasize the 
need to focus on benefit to the patient as a whole as the first determinant of 
what is to be considered ordinary or extraordinary treatment as opposed to 
the particular illness being treatedY Church teaching on this issue is less 
clear. However, from the medical perspective, a treatment is beneficial 
when it restores one's health, relieves one's pain, improves one's physical 
mobility, returns one to consciousness, enables one to communicate with 
others, and so on. 
Catholic teaching also recognizes all of these as beneficial, but it 
specifies that for a treatment to be beneficial, it must improve one's 
physical, mental and emotional condition to the point that one is able to 
pursue the spiritual goods of life, at least at a minimal level without 
experiencing significant burdens. In determining whether the burdens 
expetienced as a result of accepting treatment are significant, it is 
necessary to view the quality of life the patient will experience during and 
as a result of the treatment, its costs and the ease of access to the treatment, 
and the financial condition of the patient 's family. 24 In short, the treatment 
is burdensome unless it is obtainable with relative convenience.25 
B. Extraordinary Treatment 
The essential element of extraordinary treatment is the matter of 
what constitutes a moral impossibility for human beings in general or for a 
particular person in a given circumstance. There are five general elements 
to be considered in determining whether treatment is extraordinary. The 
first is whether the treatment is impossible to obtain or whether the ability 
to use it is unattainable. The second is whether the treatment requires 
excessive effort. An example would be undergoing a long journey or 
enduring a long and burdensome convalescence. The third element is 
whether the treatment requires a patient to endure considerable pain and 
di scomfort. An example of this is when a patient is going through 
chemotherapy. The fourth element to be considered is whether the 
treatment is excessively expensive, taking into consideration the patient's 
economic status and country of origin. This fourth consideration is subject 
to criticism because it fails to advocate for equal access to health care by all 
persons. The final element is whether the treatment causes the patient fear 
or repugnance to such a degree that it is burdensome for the patient to 
endure the treatment. Amputation procedures and, in some cultures, 
receiving treatment from female doctors are examples where fear and 
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repugnance can render a treatment extraordinary. While the pain factor in 
amputation procedures has been alleviated through modern medical 
techniques, repugnance at the idea of living with a mutilated body would 
still make the procedure extraordinary for some, especially in situations 
where a di sabled individual is a burden to his or her family. 
In short, jUdging whether a means is extraordinary or not requires an 
evaluation of the treatment's effectiveness, the burden on the patient, and 
the burden on his or her community. This evaluation requires an inquiry 
into the patient's emotions and whether the patient and the community 
have the means to acquire the treatment without denying others access to 
basic necessities. Examples of such include education, food and shelter. 
Therefore, an evaluation of extraordinary means includes an understanding 
of a patient 's responsibility to seek out reasonable care and not to seek out 
care that would require the patient to forsake hi s or her obligations to 
others. In situations where a patient is determined to seek out 
extraordinary treatment at the expense of his or her obligations to others, 
and the patient 's finances cannot cover treatment expenses, then it can be 
argued that the financier of the treatment has an equal obligation to 
determine whether, in light of all elements discussed, the treatment is 
extraordinary. One element to be considered by a third-party financier is 
whether payment of another's AIDS-related medical expenses will deplete 
the financier 's resources to the point that he or she is unable to meet other 
responsibilities, such as food, lodging, clothing and education for other 
family members. If it is determined to be extraordinary, then the financier 
has a moral obligation to withhold funds. 
C. Medical Futility 
At least in the United States, contemporary ethical futility debates 
have surfaced because factors such as quality of life, cost containment, 
gender, wealth, and patient's age impact physicians' decisions to withhold 
or withdraw treatments.26 Often these decisions would be made without 
involving the patient or the family. Because of the manner in which futility 
decisions had been made by physicians, both the public and patient 
autonomy advocates began expressing increased concern over the need to 
develop a clear working definition of medical futility that included the 
required involvement of patients or guardiansY The need for a 
comprehensive medical futility definition has taken on renewed emphasis 
in the present environment of medical malpractice litigation. 
The term "futility" derives from the Latin word utilis, meaning 
something that cannot achieve the desired effect through an intrinsic 
failure. Because of the inability to affect the desired objective, the action is 
useless. In the context of medical treatment, there is no clear consensus on 
a definition for medical futility. The concern is that by defining the term, a 
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doctor's ability to apply his or her knowledge and experience to a medical 
condition and determine the best course of action to be followed will be 
undermined. If a treatment were to fall within an adopted futility definition, 
then it is possible that a doctor would be prevented from using it. 
While no formal definition exists, many medical associations have 
applied their collective experience in providing guidance as to what types 
of treatment would be futile . For example, focu sing solely on cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), the American Thoracic Society believes 
that CPR is a futile treatment in those circumstances when, in all 
probability, its application will not result in a meaningful survival for the 
pat ient. 28 The American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Judicial 
and Ethical Affairs differs from the Thoracic Society. The AMA Council 
considers CPR to be futile when it fail s to achieve its physical intended 
purpose, restoration of cardiac activity.29 
The debate regarding what is considered a futile treatment is 
illustrated in the above examples. For the Thoracic Society, the focus is on 
qualitative results. The AMA focu ses on the quantitative results. Another 
definition focu ses on the probability of success, citing those treatments 
employed to "achieve a result that is possible but that reasoning or 
experience suggests is highly improbable and that cannot be systematically 
produced."30 Others consider futile treatments to be those through which 
the pain and suffering experience makes the treatment more burdensome 
than beneficial.31 
Two renowned bioethicists, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress, suggest that a futile treatment is one that has no possibility of 
being efficacious or is not capable of producing a desired effect.32 These 
authors implicitly incorporate the burdensome, quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives of other physicians and ethicists into their concept of 
efficaciousness.33 In this way, it is the most encompassing proposed 
definition for futile medical treatment. Regardless of which model you 
appl y, there is a general consensus that in pronounced cases of futile 
medical treatment, where the treatment will not even achieve the desired 
physical result, a physician is not morally or legally bound to provide it. 34 
Some writers argue that not only are physicians not morally or 
legally bound, but that they further have a social and moral duty not to 
administer futile medical measures for the following reasons: 
(1) It would be an irresponsible waste of resources, especially where 
nations follow a rationing system 
(2) Patients with means would simply change doctors or institutions 
un ti l they found one who would provide the futile treatment, thereby 
undermining the futility paradigm, as well as needed uniform medical 
standards in societies. 
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(3) Providing a futile treatment would give false hope to the patient 
and family, leading to inevitable disappointments and, at the same time, 
creating false expectations in the general community regarding what 
scientific medical advances are able to achieve.35 
These arguments can also be applied to sub-Saharan African nations 
and communities in their effort to provide health care to AIDS end-stage 
terminal illnesses. In the above discussion on futile medical treatment, the 
focus is on the physician who determines whether a treatment is 
quantitatively futile and the patient who determines whether a treatment is 
burdensome or qualitatively futile. However, in the context of sSA where 
the government and communities bear the burden of paying for HIV / AIDS 
treatment, the understanding of medical futility needs to be expanded to 
incorporate the perspective of the one allocating resources in order to pay 
for the treatment. 
This is similar to the situation of an insurance company examining a 
treatment and designating it experimental, and therefore, not covered. 
Similarly, it is akin to socialized medicine in Canada or the United 
Kingdom, where the government determines what procedures will be 
covered, by means of treatment rationing. However, the need to draw 
futility distinctions in sSA based on communal costs versus patient 
benefits is significantly elevated because of the extreme poverty, the high 
percentage of HIV / AIDS infection as well as other diseases, such as 
malaria and tuberculosis, and the resulting drain they have on the limited 
resources of sSA communities and governments. 
IV. sSA Economic Conditions 
Africa starts the 21st centUlY as the poorest, the most 
technologically backward, the most debt distressed. and the most 
marginalized region in the world. It accounts for 12.5% of the 
world's population but produces only 3.7% of global GDP 36 
The biggest challenge facing sSA countries is allocation of limited 
resources. Major problems include fighting containable insect-borne and 
communicable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis; treating 
nutrition-related illnesses; fighting the AIDS epidemic; treating HIV / AIDS 
victims; and building an infrastructure that will allow for increased 
economic growth and education. In order to comprehend the magnitude of 
this challenge, it is necessary to understand the present economic 
conditions of sSA countries. 
Fourteen of the world's poorest countries are in sSA. The gross 
national product per capita in sSA ranged from US$130 to US$200. 37 In 
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the early 1990s, the economic growth rate of this region averaged 1.5%, 
the lowest in the world.38 In 1995, fifty-two percent of sSA's population 
survived on one dollar per day.39 As a result of the extreme poverty of this 
region, malnutrition-related illnesses are commonplace. "Chronic protein 
and micronutrient malnutrition is associated with stunting and wasting and 
with many diseases, some of them deadly: blindness, chronic diarrhea, 
acute respiratory infections, goiter, anemia, and more."40 Seventy percent 
of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood, yet over the 
past fifty years, more than 650 million square kilometers of farmland have 
been lost to desertification.41 Even with the devastation the AIDS epidemic 
has inflicted on the population of the area, the population continues to 
grow at a rate faster than any other developing region: 3.2% as compared 
to 2.1 % in Latin America and 1.8 in Asia.42 The educational system is 
virtually nonexistent for the majority of the children in sSA. Eighty 
million children have no access to elementary school and only 2% of the 
population attends institutions of higher education.43 The drain on this 
region 's resources is further complicated by the high incidence of malaria 
infections, which kills more than one million people in sSA annually, and 
tuberculosis, which infected 864,000 sSA people in 1999 alone.44 
In short, sSA populations are poor and the government resources 
available to assist citizens are insufficient to meet even the more 
fundamental needs such as food and education. Against this backdrop, the 
HIV / AIDS epidemic continues to devastate the population of sSA. In 
2000 alone, 2.4 million people in sSA died of AIDS-related illnesses, while 
another 3.4 million became infected.45 UNAIDS estimates that there are 
34 million people infected with the HIV / AIDS virus. Of that number, 23 
million live in sSA.46 The impact on the families of AIDS victims is not 
limited to emotional impact. For example, it is estimated that by 2005, 4.2 
million sSA children will be orphaned as a consequence of AIDS.47 Not 
only does AIDS result in people being widowed and orphaned, but perhaps 
more significantly is the financial toll as a family 's income is typically 
reduced by more than half when the infected member becomes disabled or 
dies.48 
In addition to its impact on families, the AIDS epidemic is also 
affecting the economic growth of these countries. One report estimates that 
the AIDS epidemic will be the decisive factor in these already impoverished 
economies, which are expected to shrink by approximately 25 % over the 
next 20 years. Further, the potential to develop is being devastated in these 
countries. The impact on the labor force alone is terrible. For example, the 
life expectancy of the average sSA worker has declined by more than 20 
years because of the AIDS crisis. Consequently, the ability for firms to 
compete has been significantly compromised because of the increased 
expenditures due to increased health care costs and the need to replace 
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employees. At the same time, revenues are decreasing because of the 
effect that absenteeism and allocation of resources to employee training are 
having on productivity.49 
One of the many problems facing sSA is the cost of drugs that are 
used to treat AIDS patients. Merck and Bristol-Meyers have cut their 
prices in order to make AIDS drugs more affordable in sSA. 50 AIDS 
cocktails in sSA now cost US$500-600 per person per year.51 An lndian-
based generic drug manufacturer, Cipla, Ltd., now offers generic versions 
of eight of fifteen HIV cocktail drugs to sSA governments at an even more 
reduced price of $350 per person per year.52 
V. Application of the Principles of Ordinary and Extraordinary 
Treatment and Medical Futility to HIV / AIDS in sSA 
A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her CD4+ cell 
count drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood count (normal CD4+ count is 
1000) or when CD4+ cells comprise less than 14% of the individual 's total 
lymphocytes.53 
Standard treatment in Western countries for HIV I AIDS patients is a 
15 drug regimen known as the AIDS cocktail, which has proven to reduce 
transmission of the HIV virus. The cocktails are grouped into three 
classes: nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs), nonnucleoside 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs), and protetease inhibitors (PIs).54 
Because of the patient's deteriorating immune system, the patient is at risk 
for contracting opportunistic diseases seldom seen in individuals with 
healthy immune systems. Use of the cocktail during this phase can help to 
elevate white blood cell levels, thereby slowing the deterioration of the 
immune system. It has proven to be an effective treatment for prolonging 
HIV I AIDS patients' lives. However, the cocktail regimen's side effects are 
similar to that of chemotherapy and unlike cancer treatment, the cocktail 
has to be taken for the duration of the AIDS patient's life. 
As already stated, this treatment is expensive. For sSA populations, 
even having access at the reduced prices now available, the cocktail is still 
cost prohibitive. The alternative to the cocktail is the use of a single drug 
and this approach has proven to be ineffective because of the speed with 
which the body becomes resistant to the drug. At most, use of a single drug 
showed an effectiveness of one to two years. Understanding the cost and 
effectiveness of treatment is critical in determining whether the available 
treatments should be considered ordinary or extraordinary in the contexts 
of AIDS in sSA. So far, almost no attention has been given to this 
important and challenging project of assisting communities to come up 
with medical spending decisions. 
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Other components are also necessary in evaluating how AIDS 
treatment should be categorized. Because of the impoverished conditions 
of these communities, there is no guarantee of supply. Once a person starts 
taking the cocktail, or even an individual drug, it is important that the 
patient remain faithful to the regimen because otherwise resistance to the 
drug(s) will develop. As a result, should the patient resume treatment, the 
effectiveness of the regimen is reduced. Also, even if supply can be 
guaranteed, the impoverished conditions of most AIDS patients in sSA 
coupled with their lack of education and the harshness of the side effects of 
the drug(s) makes it questionable whether the patients themselves will be 
faithful to the regimen. Finally, the lack of infrastructure and skilled 
medical personnel makes it difficult for patients on the drug regimen to 
have the necessary access to medical resources that will allow them to 
receive follow-up medical care and consultation. The depletion in medical 
personnel is due to many doctors and nurses leaving sSA to practice in 
Western countries. Many of those who remained have, themselves, fallen 
victim to the AIDS epidemic. In fact, access to doctors is so limited that, in 
this commentator's personal experience, it is not uncommon for nurses in 
sSA to prescribe medication. 
Applying the ordinary/extraordinary principles to the reality of AIDS 
in sSA, treatment for AIDS either using the cocktail or even the individual 
drug regimen should be termed extraordinary treatment. The fact that even 
using the most effective treatment currently available can only guarantee 
the progress of the disease will be delayed and the fact that the treatment 
must be taken for life strongly supports this position . The cost of the 
treatment is depleting the meager resources of families , communities, and 
governments. Other pressing concerns affecting the entire population are 
at risk of being abandoned because of the high cost of treatment. 
Applying the guidelines provided above, it is the moral 
responsibility of all people to seek that care which is reasonable under the 
circumstances. One element in determining what is reasonable is the 
burden the treatment places on those for whom the patient is responsible. 
Given the economic conditions in sSA, the burden on family and 
community is too great for it to be moral to divert resources to the 
treatment of HIV / AIDS patients. If a patient without financial resources 
seeks out treatment at the communities' expense, then it becomes the 
responsibility of the community to withhold the finances needed to obtain 
treatment . 
If the present drug regimens are deemed extraordinary, then what 
treatment is ordinary? The treatment that is considered to be ordinary is 
that treatment which is within the financial means of the community, taking 
into consideration the needs of the community. In the situation of sSA, 
ordinary means would be those pain medications financially affordable, 
26 Linacre Quarterly 
that will enable the AIDS patient to be as comfortable as possible and when 
the end comes, help the person to die in comfort and with dignity. 
This position is equally supported by the medical futility principle. As 
previously stated, a treatment is medically futile if it is unable to achieve its 
intended end or if its burden on the patient outweighs the benefits. While most 
scholars focus on the physician and the patient as determining which 
treatment is futile, in the case of sSA, I would expand this to include the 
financier of the treatment, in most cases the family and/or the government. 
I would also add as a component of medical futility the burden to the 
community in light of the present inability to cure the patient of the illness. 
It is clearly established that the cost of the cocktail makes that 
treatment un affordable for sSA populations. Even if it could be made 
affordable, issues of supply and willingness to remain faithful to the 
treatment make it highly improbable that the treatment is able to achieve its 
intended purpose, substantial prolongation of life. The use of a single drug 
is of greater futility because even under the best of circumstances, its 
benefits to the patient are minimal. The cost to the family and community, 
however, continues to be disproportionately high. 
In the event a cure is found, the analysis would be different. While 
the cost would certainly be high, it would not entail a commitment to a 
treatment lasting the lifetime of each AIDS patient in a given community. 
Also, the ability for each of these individuals to return to a productive 
condition because of being cured would change the equation. However, 
given the high numbers of infected individuals, 23 million as of the year 
2000, even in the event of a cure, difficult decisions would most likely 
need to be made as to priority of receipt of treatment. The high cost 
associated with distributing any curative treatment and the fragile and 
impoverished infrastructure of these regions would certainly require 
somebody having to decide who will receive the curative treatment to live 
and who will be left to die. 
VI. Conclusion 
The problem of HIV / AIDS in sSA is challenging the traditional ways 
of caring for terminally ill patients. One of these challenges in providing 
health care, especially to AIDS victims, is the problem of cost containment. 
This paper has discussed the application of the Catholic Church's 
casuistic method of ordinary and extraordinary medical procedure as one 
of the ways sSA communities and governments can solve the problem of 
cost containment. We have argued that the ordinary means of caring for 
terminal AIDS patients is pain relief medical care. AIDS patients are 
intrinsically valuable even when they are dying. While we cannot dispute 
this fact, according to the traditional Catholic teaching on prolonging life, 
February, 2004 27 
there are times when human life must be sacrificed for other goods. For 
example, there is no moral obligation to continue disproportionate high-
cost treatments if there is no hope of a cure. At times, death becomes 
something we might choose rather than something that happens to us. To 
date, the question of what treatment obligations are owed to AIDS victims 
is one that has been ignored by both the governments and the religious 
communities. Most pastoral letters issued by the Catholic Church, for 
example, deal with the morality of condom use and sexual promiscuity.55 
However, to date, no Bishops' Conference has addressed the morality issue 
concerning whether it is necessary to provide treatment to AIDS victims at 
the cost of further depleting the already scare resources of the 
communities. 
A comprehensive approach to providing medical care to the AIDS 
epidemic in sSA must not only address moral and social issues. Economic 
issues, such as planning medical spending decisions, must be regarded as 
very critical especially at this time when there is no vaccine or cure for 
HIV I AIDS. In failing to do this, the results will jeopardize everything the 
economically disadvantaged societies of sub-Saharan Africa have achieved 
ever since the end of colonial political, economic, and religious 
domination. 
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